As modern developments in communication have made for greater realism they have made for greater possibilities of delusion. Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication (1995, p. 82) H OW do communication technologies condition the way we communicate and, consequently, the ways in which we conceptualize the world and our place in it? This question is acquiring more and more relevance as we recognize the power of communication technologies to either enhance or distort our perception of reality. Can we argue that the interiorization of certain technologies leads to an alienated view of the world, while others effectively increase our understanding of it? Can we create a standard for evaluating which applications of technology are liberatory and which are oppressive? In other words, can we differentiate between various applications of communication technologies according to their ability to ''ontologically reintegrate the individual to the world'' (Bhola, 1992) ?
To think critically about such matters-especially in an age when technology is uncritically revered-is a complex and unpopular task, but one we need to undertake with urgency. As we end the millennium, we find ourselves Chicago, IL. living in an increasingly polarized world where communication itself is becoming a highly commodified process requiring certain tools and adherence to certain paradigms, and where those who reject or do not have access to these tools and paradigms run the risk of being silenced, incommunicated. Communication technologies are sensitive to political forces, and their commodification corresponds to the formation of monopolies of knowledge (Innis, 1995) . It is not coincidental that the growing division between the techno-literate and the technoilliterate replicates old models of hegemony and oppression, as evidenced in the use of terms such as information neo-colonialism and technological apartheid. Although we are finally coming to a point where communication technologies are seen neither as neutral nor autonomous agents in the construction of social meaning, we still have a long way to go in terms of evaluating these technologies according to the sustainable or unsustainable values embedded in their design and application. In order to do this, we first need to undertake the study of a process I call the technologizing of communication.
To talk about a specific technologizing of communication is to socially contextualize the process of communication as it is shaped by a particular technology. In other words, a technologizing of communication is the distinctive way in which people employ communication technologies to construct a shared social reality. The study of a technologizing of communication begins with the following assumptions: 1) Technologies are not just material artifacts, but ways of organizing knowledge and meaning. 2) A communication process is shaped not only by human agents, but by non-human agents (i.e. technologies) as well. 3) Communication technologies have macro and micro social dimensions. On the one hand, they form part of global systems and networks. On the other, meaning does not travel ''freely,'' but is contested and transformed at each location across these networks; in other words, their use and the nature of the communication process is unique to a community.
To speak of technologizings of communication, thus, is to see technology in all of its complex relations: not as one ''Microsoftian'' monolith, but as multi-dimensional networks crisscrossed by proliferating intersections. To speak of technologizings of communication is also to abandon the debate between social determinism and technological determinism. This dispute trapped us into a dichotomy: Communication technologies are either neutral, shaped by a social context, or autonomous, shaping the social context themselves. To speak of technologizings of communication is finally to acknowledge that humans and technology mutually shape each other.
By addressing the particularity of technological applications, the study of the technologizings of communication also challenges two common misconceptions. First, those who maintain that the liberatory use of communication technologies depends only on their proper application (see Drew, 1995; Sclove, 1995; Lemke, 1998 ) must revise their arguments to admit that ultimately it is the mutually shaped sociotechnological context and not the technology itself that promotes or hinders liberatory uses. Technologies which are seen as democratic or emancipatory in one context can be oppres-sive in another, and vice versa. Second, the argument that a philosophy for the design of sustainable or appropriate technologies is possible within the framework of multiculturalism (see Drengson, 1995) is also problematic. The often stated objective of multiculturalism is to transcend Eurocentric perspectives. However, to form a composite of approaches to technological design by picking and choosing from the global marketplace of ideas is not to abandon homogenizing modes of thinking: besides requiring a privileged position within a Eurocentric paradigm to begin with, such an approach imposes an absolute relativism (Latour, 1995) in which every idea must be objectively considered as valid as the next one. This ultimately obstructs the assessment and comparison of the consequences that particular technologizings of communication promote.
Communicational Realities and Technology
Technologies are not mere exterior aids but also interior transformations of consciousness . . . Technology, properly interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances it. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy (1982, p. 82-83) The correspondence between communication and community extends beyond etymological kinship (both stemming from the Latin communis, which means common). We know that communication is the basis for society, for as Fernback and Thompson (1995) argue, ''without communication there can be no action to organize social relations'' (online document). But in order to better understand the complexities of this relationship, we need to ask what role communication technologies play in the formation of communities, or in what ways the technologies we use to communicate impact the forms of community that we form.
Communication is technological, artificial, in that its codes are generated and manipulated. What separates us from other life forms is precisely our ability to construct dynamic and complex language codes. As Ong (1982) suggests, far from being an impediment, artificiality is quite natural to humans: We need artifacts to change the world materially, as well as symbolically. So even though communication is artificial, we consider the act of communication a naturally human act.
If communication is artificial, the communities we conceptualize through communication are equally contrived, and thus mutually shaped by technology. Communities are based on a set of shared values and beliefs-whether negotiated or imposed-that are produced and replicated (i.e. communicated) through the use of technology. We can describe this process as that of creating what Thayer (1987) calls communicational realities: sets of ''ideas, beliefs, preferences, qualities, evils, and ideals which exist for us essentially because they can be and are talked about'' (p. 172). Communities, then, are social realities instantiated through communication technologies.
By shaping the way we communicate, technologies co-determine the parameters for our interaction with the world. What is important is not the way humans make communication an artificial act, for even the most simple forms of communication depend on a technology (if we define technologies not just as tools but also as ways of organizing knowledge, such as language systems). What is important, then, are the values that emerge out of the process of communication using a particular technology. Critical approaches to the study of technology as it mediates communication should not seek to research romanticized ''pretechnological'' forms of communication (for they do not exist). Instead, they should concentrate on the study of how different configurations of society and technology result in different understandings of the world. Particular attention should be paid to the configurations expressed in Modernity, and the characteristic understanding of the world that they provide.
Modernity, as defined by Wise (1997) , is the dominant episteme of Western culture, philosophically grounded on Descartes' dualism of mind and body and Kant's separation of Self and Other; an episteme that, according to Latour (1993) , has established an unsustainable separation between humans (society) and non-humans (technology), and between the present and the past. Thus, the critical study of the sustainability of Modern communicational realities is not an unbiased exercise, since it attempts to reverse the disassociation between technology and society that the Modern episteme has imposed. The urgency of this task derives from the fact that Modern communication technologies, when uncritically applied, tend to promote unsocial, community-corroding values. This has as much to do with the biases of the technologies themselves as with the social systems out of which these technologies emerge. Communicational realities in which power is distributed unevenly and hierarchically will coexist with technologies that replicate those same social relations. According to Fernback and Thompson (1995) , for example, cyberspace simultaneously replicates and promotes the trend towards the privatization of social space:
The extension of community into cyberspace is a natural outgrowth of the shift from an emphasis on the public to the private in the United States. The notion of community is a ''public'' concept in that it entails a collectivity of sorts. But virtual community has a private quality about it; it may be who we are as private individuals that constitutes our membership in certain communities, e.g., virtual communities based on political ties or communities of interest based on world view, hobbies, or professional status. Thus, a private character is ascribed to the idea of community as our individuality increasingly defines our choice of community membership, despite the nature of community as a social bond. (on-line document) Thus, Modern communication technologies simultaneously reflect and engender the values of the communicational realities in which they are embedded. As communicational realities have become increasingly privatized and individualized-the antithesis, in fact, of community-communication technologies have become more alienating. Luke (1993) argues, ''Composed of clients and consumers, communities today are not much more than an aggregation of atomized individuals organized into discrete geographic-legal units' ' (p. 209) . Thus, although communication is conducive to the creation of communities, it is not necessarily conducive to ethically sound or sustainable communities. A community based on values of justice, equality, and respect for others and for the environment is not the same as a community based on values of self-interest, materialism, and intolerance. It would be impossible for both communities to use the same communication technologies in the same way and to share the same communicational realities.
The process by which communicational realities become dominant in a given community is a political one. Because communication is artifical and because it is substantiated by artifacts of our own creation, it is a site of political and ideological contestation. Elite groups might hold the power to not only design and produce technologies, but also to decide how these technologies should be used, therefore controlling which values become dominant in our communicational realities. Oftentimes, this is not a violent process, but one in which people are hegemonically discouraged to think critically about those values. Take, for example, the negative effects that online communities, despite their present day glorification, have on diversity. Fernback and Thompson (1995) argue:
So although communities may be formed that reinforce social relationships among like-minded individuals, those groups will have a decreasing need or opportunity to interact with other members of the larger society. Instead of creating increasing cohesion, virtual communities are likely to have the opposite effect on the larger collectivity. We should not mistake a desire for communities of interest with a hope for a more just and egalitarian society. Just as multiculturalism can and does have a positive influence on self and group identity but when taken to an extreme can disrupt the larger society, so virtual communities can foster anomie. (online document)
There is something about our Modern system of values that allows for communication technologies to be used to engender realities that are increasingly disassociated from the values of democracy and community; in short, the communicational realities that result in the creation of unsocial spaces. Ellul (1992) argues that Modern technologies obliterate ''all that makes social groups possible-myths, beliefs, laws, morality'' (p. 37) and replace it with the logic of efficiency, a logic that runs contrary to the inefficient openendedness of true democracy. For Ellul, technique (technology at the service of efficiency, not democracy) has become the paradigm for all technological practice and design, a paradigm devoid of any considerations of virtue and ethics, and hence with few democratic possibilities. When these technologies are designed and implemented, the impact that they will have on communicational realities is not taken into consideration from an ethical standpoint; what matters is their potential to increase productivity and efficiency. Lochhead (1995) correlates this absence of a discourse on ethics with the conceptualization of the split between fact and value in Modern philosophy: ''To the modern mind, the question of fact is a matter of objective truth. Fact is objective . . . To be objective is to be real. Value on the other hand is not objective . . . Values are subjective . . . Values are unreal'' (online document). He goes on to argue that:
It is one thing to argue that one cannot derive fact from value or, on the other hand, that one cannot derive value from fact. It is quite another thing to equate ''fact'' with reality. For when we suggest that ''facts'' are ''real'' but ''values'' are subjective and not ''real,'' we are always making a value judgment. We want to use the word ''reality'' in what strikes me as a rather prejudicial way. We want to expel considerations of value, of good and evil, from ''reality.'' But we can only do that by implicitly pronouncing the factual, the objective, to be the Good. (online document)
The problem is that Modernity perceives technologies as part of a factual reality that is not only beyond value considerations, but is in fact intrinsi-cally good. It considers only the material dimension of technology, and not its immaterial dimension: technologies are real, whereas our evaluations of them are not. The split between facts and values, then, becomes the pretext by which we can renounce the responsibility of thinking ethically about technology. As long as we believe that virtual realities (realities purged of values) are just as good as their counterparts, we are exempt from thinking about them critically and ethically.
This reasoning is misleading in two ways. First, no reality is beyond value considerations. Second, although these virtual realities might create the illusion of community, they are quite far from representing ethically-sound and sustainable communities. According to Fernback and Thompson (1995) :
Citizenship via cyberspace has not proven to be the panacea for the problems of democratic representation within American society; although communities of interest have been formed and strengthened (as noted previously) and have demonstrated a sense of solidarity, they have nevertheless contributed to the fragmented cultural and political landscape of the United States that is replete with identity politics and the unfulfilled promise of a renewed vita activa. (online document) Therefore, what is needed is a tool to ''measure'' or assess the ethical implications of different technologizings of communication, a tool to evaluate them according to their impact on the values of a society. This tool will allow us to compare communicational realities in terms of the quality of communities they produce. This tool I propose to call the sustainable communicational reality.
This concept is formed by qualifying the term communicational reality, as defined above by Thayer (1987) , with the word sustainable, as understood in the context of the environmentalist movement. Sustainable can go a long way in invoking what constitutes an ethicallysound communicational reality. According to Engel (in Pepper, 1996) , the word implies:
. . . commitment to human solidarity and distributional justice (including future generations), a good life for all, a shared worldwide morality, spiritually nourishing as well as physically prolonged lives, moral and religious rearmament, reaffirmation of the individual-in-community and of the earth as a mosaic of diverse, co-evolving, selfgoverning, self-planning communities (hence individualistic societies and nation states are inadmissible). (p. 75) Sustainable communicational realities emerge when technologies are interiorized according to positive values such as equality, dignity, and justice. They result in a holographic view of the world, an interconnectedness between humans and their environment. Unsustainable communicational realities, on the other hand, emerge when technologies are interiorized according to negative values such as individualism, materialism, and reductionism. They result in a dichotomized, fragmented view of the universe, with humans in constant conflict with their environments.
The development of sustainable communicational realities must happen concurrently with the development of new technologies capable of supporting them. The first question to be posed is whether in fact some aspects of Modern communication technologies can be salvaged for the purpose of building sustainable communicational realities. Current efforts seem to suggest that although the majority of applications of Modern technologies result in unsustainability, there are some uses that could potentially inform a sustainable communicational reality. The question then becomes what to keep and what to discard. In that vein, Kollock (1996) argues that ''[a]s the online world is a wholly constructed environment, it is worth considering what features, constraints, and challenges of the physical world might be profitably introduced into virtual worlds'' (online document). The issue of identity serves well to illustrate this problem. Kollock (1996) writes that ''one of the attractive features of online interaction is the fluidity of identity-one can adopt a new persona with each and every interaction. But work on social dilemmas argues that identity persistence is a necessary feature of cooperative relations'' (online document). Whether identity persistence by itself can transform online interaction into a sustainable communicational reality is an open question at this time, and so it is with the larger question of what, if any, aspects of Modern communication technologies can be integrated into sustainable communicational realities.
Research into the sustainability of Modern technologies is still in its infancy, and the public acceptance of its results is not guaranteed. Furthermore, time is a luxury when developments in the field of Modern communication technology are happening at a vertiginous pace. Not many developers seem to be taking the time to ask if their technologies follow Ostrom's (1990) simple design principles for successful communities: Group boundaries are clearly defined, rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions, individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules, the right of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities, a system for monitoring members' behavior exists, this monitoring is undertaken by the community members themselves, a graduated system of sanctions is used, and community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
A discourse on environmental sustainability has allowed us to develop a cross-cultural vision of what is good or damaging for the planet. Likewise, a discourse on the sustainability of communicational realities will allow us to talk about those technologizings that need to be affirmed in order to promote an understanding of the world invested in values of justice, respect, and equality-instead of alienation, escapism, and individualism.
The Unsustainable Abstractions of Virtuality
In all simulation, the craving for reality prevails. Florian Rö tzer, Virtual Worlds: Fascinations and Reactions (1995, p. 124) Modern communication technologies promote unsustainable communicational realities because they present a bias towards literacy, or to be more specific, towards an improperly interiorized literacy. In order to understand this bias, Ong's (1982) comparative work on orality and literacy is useful to refer to. Here I will limit myself to a summary of his most relevant arguments in regards to the biases of literacy as compared with orality.
Oral enunciations cease to exist as soon as the sound is uttered and heard, whereas text remains as a material record once it is written down. Therefore, Ong (1982) argues that orality is biased towards impermanence and literacy is biased towards permanence. Furthermore, he argues that the imper-manence of orality translates into a need for the continuous re-creation of meaning; whereas in literacy, meaning is ''fixed'' in time by virtue of its materiality. (This might actually not be entirely accurate, for as Olson (1989) has pointed out, writing preserves the words but not their meaning.) Therefore, Ong argues that orality is more conducive to the creation of social space because it requires an audience of at least one live human being to listen and respond. On the other hand, literacy requires only an imagined audience in the mind of the author as she or he writes, or an individual reader. Thus, orality is a social experience whereas literacy is an individual experience.
Ong's (1982) most crucial observation is that orality requires that we take a subjective position vis-a-vis the world, whereas literacy requires that we distance ourselves from it, assuming an objective position. He argues that orality enables an identification of the knower with the known, whereas literacy establishes a separation between the two:
Writing fosters abstractions that disengage knowledge from the arena where human beings struggle with one another. It separates the knower from the known. By keeping knowledge embedded in the human lifeworld, orality situates knowledge within a context of struggle. (pp. 43-44) The ''struggle'' to which Ong (1982) refers is the constant need in orality to re-create meaning with each enunciation and to negotiate meaning with our interlocutors. The spoken word articulates reality and embeds knowledge in our immediate environment, promoting extroversion and subjective analysis, a concern with the world in which we live. Meaning is created through translation: constant negotiation between the Self and the Others. Our existence and the existence of the world is substantiated by our naming of the world (Freire, 1971) . On the other hand, according to Ong, the interaction between us and the world is of a more abstract nature in literacy. The written word transfers knowledge from the world outside to the world inside, allowing for introspection and objective analysis. Writing requires that we assume a position outside our environment, spatially and temporally, from which we can objectively describe it. Hence Ong's observation that it separates the knower from the known. Literacy is ''autonomous discourse'': discourse which does not require an immediate engagement with its environment.
It should be stated clearly that the purpose of this comparison is not to establish a hierarchy between orality and literacy, but simply to describe their biases in the creation of communicational realities. Despite its unsocial tendencies as a technology, Ong (1982) himself recognizes the importance of literacy: ''Writing introduces division and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It intensifies the sense of self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness-raising'' (p. 179). Although literacy might not be optimally conducive to social interaction, it can be a powerful tool for self-knowledge, and lead to more meaningful social exchange. Ideally, both orality and literacy should be equally important parts in the process of ontological integration of the individual to the world. Unfortunately, Modernity has forestalled this possibility by introducing the idea of a historical transition between ''pre-Modern'' orality and ''Modern'' literacy, a transition which positions orality as an outdated communication technology to be replaced with literacy-based technologies, most recently in the form of textbased computer interfaces. Without the idea of a historical transition from oral to textual technologies-from the spoken word to the printed word to the hypertextualized word-there is nothing to separate Modern ''Man'' from the barbarian-the Other. This transition was engineered to serve as a monument in the Modern consciousness of the literate mind's victory over the oral (i.e. primitive) mind. The literate Self, leading the way towards modernization and civilization, was positioned high above the illiterate Other, always lagging behind technologically. Needless to say, this could only be achieved by turning oral technologies and verbomotor societies into prehistoric relics. In the words of Latour (1993) , ''Modern temporality gave the impression of continuous acceleration by relegating ever-larger masses of humans and nonhumans together to the void of the past'' (pp. 135-136). In their effort to render the Others illiterate, it is the Moderns who have become iloral.
Another way to understand the mechanics of this transition is to consider the biases of orality and literacy in relation to time and space. Innis (1995) proposes that certain communication technologies, such as orality, have a bias towards time, while other technologies, such as literacy, have a bias towards space. A bias towards time is present in technologies which centralize knowledge and emphasize tradition. Conversely, a bias towards space is present in technologies which diffuse knowledge and promote expansion. Thus, the transition from orality to literacy can be seen as an attempt to separate time-biased societies (with their concern for conservation, continuity, and the permanence of knowledge) from space-biased societies (with their concern for innovation, discontinuity and the impermanence of knowledge). This separation is not just an innocuous way to index the ending of a ''primitive'' era and the beginning of one of ''progress'' and ''civilization.'' It brings with it the introduction of a whole set of values: expansion as colonization, speed at the cost of nuance, efficiency at the cost of alienation, uncritical accumulation, homogenization instead of diversity, and reductionism as the dominant epistemology.
Therefore, the exclusive reliance of Modern communication technologies on literacy has had detrimental repercussions for our communicational realities. This reliance is not only obvious in technologies that depend almost exclusively on text to function, such as e-mail and the World Wide Web. Even the audio-visual or ''multimedia'' technologies, where text does not play a central role, reflect a textual way of thinking: They encourage individual consumption, interactivity with an object and not with other humans, and a separation of the knower and the known. Regardless of whether we are talking about a book, a movie, a radio show, or a chat room, textual and nontextual technologies alike exhibit these characteristics. The kind of abstraction that literacy brings has its undeniable benefits (as mentioned above, it affords a higher level of consciousness), but my concern here is less with the possible usefulness of literacy and more with the actual way in which it has been applied in a consumerist society: as a hegemonic technology used to discriminate against orality and other technologies, not only changing the way we communicate but also the way we look at the world. This particular application of literacy is the back-bone of the symptom of (post)Modernity known as virtuality.
Virtuality claims that a representation of the real is just as good or even better than the real. Therefore, virtuality strives to displace reality with an enhanced representation of reality, something it can only do thanks to the abstractions literacy and textual ways of thinking have granted it. Without abstraction there is no representation. Without the separation of the knower from the known there is no possibility of simulation. Without literacy there are no symbols (textual or graphic) to occupy the place of the signified, to re-present the known. Contrary to the common understanding of the term, virtuality is an unsustainable communicational reality not because it creates a fantastic, out-of-this-world reality, but because it creates the illusion that ''mundane'' reality can be replicated (or indeed, transcended) through the simulacrum of representation. Rö tzer (1995) argues that ''the media have changed not only the understanding of the real, but also, and above all, the expectation of it. We no longer want to flee from the real by means of fiction; on the contrary, we now want fiction to evoke reality: simulation as a trap for the event'' (p. 125).
Virtuality, therefore, is less about cyber-suits and more about CNN. Already we are conditioned by the media to believe that if something cannot be represented, simulated (digitized, pixelized, recorded), it is not real, or at least not worth experiencing. What else does the word ''media'' imply but a process of mediation? The way events are experienced through the media has become completely virtual: carefully orchestrated information sequences of selected representations put together by professionals and specialists for our passive, leisurely consumption. However, there is something very contradictory in this process. By confusing the consumption of information with ''being in the world,'' virtual media create in the user/viewer a false sense of integration to reality, while in fact further alienating him/her from it. The dehumanizing implications of detaching oneself from the world while imagining that one is actually more integrated in it (thanks to virtual technologies) are very serious. Kroker (1999) refers to this phenomenon as the will to virtuality, an intrinsic characteristic of Western culture, ''not simply what constitutes the content of the new world of digital reality, but, more importantly, what accounts for the dynamic drive in ancient, medieval and contemporary culture to a split reality, a substitute reality'' (p. 3, emphasis in original). This unconditional surrender to virtuality is resulting in unsustainable communicational realities: the sterile elimination of masses of Third World peoples condensed into a few images on the screen; karoshi, or the breakdown of the human body in the face of oppressive workplace technologies; and the replacement of the social community by its homogenizing, reductionist cyber-counterpart. Virtuality perpetuates social divisions along class lines by giving the elite the means to distance themselves from the ''ugliness'' of reality while maintaining their control over the means of production and information. According to Brook and Boal (1995) ,
The wish to leave the body, time, and place behind in search of electronic emulation of community does not accidentally intensify at a time when the space and time of everyday life have become so uncertain, unpleasant, and dangerous for so many-even if it is the people best insulated from risk who show the greatest fear. The litany of problems is a familiar one: people sorted into enclaves and ghettos, growing class and racial antagonisms, declining public services (including schools, libraries, and transportation), unemployment caused by automation and wandering capital, and so on. But the flight into cyberspace is motivated by some of the same fears and longings as the flights to the suburbs: it is another ''white flight.' ' (p. ix) How exactly has this unsustainable communicational reality been justified? By appealing to two of the most revered principles in Western culture: the discourses of democracy and freedom of expression.
The parallels being drawn between virtuality and democracy are quite clear in Al Gore's 1994 speech to the International Telecommunications Union:
In a sense, the GII [Global Information Infrastructure] will be a metaphor for democracy itself. Representative democracy does not work with an all-powerful central government, arrogating all decisions to itself. That is why communism collapsed. Instead, representative democracy relies on the assumption that the best way for a nation to make its political decisions is for each citizen-the human equivalent of the self-contained processor-to have the power to control his or her own life . . . The GII will not only be a metaphor for a functioning democracy, it will in fact promote the functioning of democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens in decision-making. (quoted in Brook & Boal, 1995, p. xii) Gore seems to be painting an Orwellian scenario where individuals (which he reduces to metaphorical computer processors) can be totally isolated in their virtual worlds, in ''control of their lives,'' and yet somehow participate meaningfully in society by using (consuming) Modern communication technologies. Furthermore, any alternative, such as Communism, is seen as retrograde and doomed to failure. The subtext is quite clear: To oppose virtuality is quite literally to oppose democracy and freedom. In case Gore's ''utopia'' is not enough, the West can still rely on freedom of expression, and its greatest defending lobby, the art establishment, to deal with critics of virtuality.
Modern art has disassociated any considerations of ethics and sustainability from the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure. Any artistic project is guaranteed protection in the name of the individual's freedom of expression. Furthermore, ''creative freedom'' has become a laboratory for technological experimentation where art for art's sake is an unproblematic end: ''The drive to technical mastery in the name of creative freedom has disintegrated any notion of the 'good' which is not proximate to technical willing'' (Kroker, 1999, p. 15) . Given that people are not encouraged to think critically about technology, they are now no longer prepared to think critically about the virtuality of Modern art and creative freedom. Rö tzer (1995) comments on the media's ongoing efforts to replace the real with the digital, or at least to incorporate the two, and adds: ''This is perfectly analogous with the aesthetisizing of the real as it is practiced, for instance, in installations or ''environments'' in art. Such works turn the real into art, while art is freed of its limitations'' (p. 127). He traces the roots of this desire to the concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk:
. . . the idea of creating an ''environment'' that triggers interaction between work and spectator, so that together these will constitute a whole. The ''best'' Gesamtkunstwerk in this sense corresponds to Plato's Cave, a technically constructed total illusion. As critics observed at the time, entry into an artificial world is only possible by temporary or permanent suspension of reality, so that we lose our standards of comparison and can immerse ourselves entirely in the artificial world. (p. 127) Thus, in voicing opposition to the project of virtuality one risks not only being branded an anti-Modern or a Luddite, but also a ''fascist'' who opposes democracy and freedom of expression.
Methodology and New Significance of Values
In order to address the question of how technologies condition the way we communicate, we require a methodology that not only makes explicit the processes by which social realities are (re)produced through communication technologies, but also that evaluates qualitatively the consequences of these processes. In other words, we need a methodology that not only helps us understand how technology shapes our constructions of reality, but that also aids us in determining the soundness of these constructions according to both universal and personal values. Deetz's (1982) critical-interpretive research methodology provides a good starting point for doing just that.
The goals of critical-interpretive research are insight, criticism, and education. According to Deetz (1982) , ''insight serves as reflected knowledge which raises to a level of awareness the manner of producing this knowledge and the forming of the objective character of objects and events'' (p. 138). In other words, insight helps us become aware of the processes through which we engage in the production of meaning; it forces us to question what was before taken for granted. However, insight-despite its analytical benefits-is not sufficient to facilitate social change. Hence, the second goal of criticalinterpretive research is that it must be critical: It must ''open the discursively formed reality . . . to further discourse'' (p. 140). Because knowledge is produced and not simply transmitted through the act of communication, we must become engaged in a process of self-transformation. That is why the final goal of interpretive research, according to Deetz, is education: the creation of a knowledge that allows for ''appropriately directed action as well as understanding'' (p. 139). Criticalinterpretive research, then, is a method for reflection as well as action, i.e., a praxis.
In the analysis of how communication technologies mediate our construction of reality (what I have been calling the study of the technologizings of communication), we can gain an advantageous perspective by adopting the goals of the critical-interpretive research method as outlined above. The study of the technologizings of communication starts with the creation of insight: The assumptions that we make about the world as shaped by the communication technologies we use cease to be taken for granted. This new knowledge then becomes the source for a new critical discourse that allows us to talk about the values hidden behind the technologizings that we had uncritically accepted. Technologizings become open to contestation and alternative interpretation. Finally, through education, the tools are disseminated for the conceptualization of new technologizings and their practical implementation.
Thus, the insight/criticism/education sequence can be an effective tool not only for analyzing how technologies lead to certain value-laden assump-tions about reality, but, more importantly, for transforming this knowledge into new concepts and new technologies to challenge those assumptions. Furthermore, the critical-interpretive method recognizes that the application of technology has ethical consequences: ''The choice of language systems and the development of new concepts in an organization are not neutral activities but are an engaging in the very formation of individuals and organizations. Values and ethics take on a new significance given this understanding'' (Deetz, 1982, p. 141, emphasis mine) . It is precisely this new significance of values and ethics that becomes important in the assessment of the sustainability of our communicational realities. The goal is to determine the ethical-soundness of our conceptualizations of the world as they are produced and replicated through communication technologies. However, a problem of focus in the critical-interpretive research method must first be addressed.
Critical-interpretive research requires that we look at the organization as a social space that can be read as a text and understood according to the hermeneutics of textual analysis: ''Communication in an organization is better conceptualized as intertextuality than intersubjectivity-the interplay of texts rather than subjective agents'' (Deetz, 1982, p. 137) . However, the textual metaphor might prove insufficient and inappropriate to understand complex social realities. Texts can be objectified and commodified, whereas other aspects of reality or human knowledge cannot be. Therefore, by restricting the focus to intertextuality, Deetz effectively eclipses half of reality: the half that cannot be textualized. Deetz states that texts ''. . . serve as the reality for the organization. There is no way out of them to some other reality'' (p. 137). A meta-reality, a reality outside of the organization, not only exists, but matters. Meaningful evaluations of the organization can only be made when taking into consideration both the realities within it and outside it. Positioning an inscribed discourse (a text) as the ultimate reality is a Modernist position insofar as it privileges literacy over anything else.
To support the argument that there is an extra-textual reality and that not all knowledge can be objectified according to the textual metaphor, consider the following comparison of theoretical and personalized knowledge made by Kazmi (1999): . . . [W] hereas theoretical knowledge deals with experiences that are repeatable, personal knowledge deals with non-repeatable and specific experiences that are peculiar to a human being or humans in a given situation. Now, since theoretical knowledge is almost completely objectifiable in language it can be communicated almost entirely through written language. But since personal knowledge cannot be fully captured in language it is not wholly dependent on linguistic communication. Personalized knowledge is communicated not only through language but more importantly also through styles and strategies for living. In other words, personalized knowledge is not a compendium of skill and information but rather an orientation to knowledge and the world. (p. 213; emphasis mine)
If we are to evaluate the ethical soundness of our styles and strategies for living (including the assumptions about the world that communication technologies might lead us to make), we will need a methodology that not only looks at theoretical knowledge, i.e. the knowledge that can be objectified and textualized. We will need a methodology that also takes into consideration personalized knowledge. Kazmi argues that ''to personalize knowledge is to show what difference the truth of the theoretical knowledge would make to someone who accepts it'' (p. 218). Personalized knowledge leads individuals to a critical moment in which they ask about the theoretical knowledge they have acquired: How would this knowledge about the world affect the quality of my life if I accept it to be true? From that point onwards, individuals can make autonomous and conscious decisions regarding the practical application of theoretical knowledge to their lives. Thus, to adopt a research methodology that excludes personalized knowledge is to deny individuals the opportunity to make judgments about the ethical soundness of different orientations to knowledge and the world and their practical applications. Thus, a methodology for the study of how technology mediates our understanding of the world must not be limited to theoretical knowledge, but must encompass personalized knowledge as well. When assessing the new significance of values and ethics of a technologizing of communication, judgments must be made on the basis not only of those manifestations that can be textualized, but also of those personalized ones which point to different orientations towards the world, some more sustainable than others. Personalized knowledge is not, then, about privileging the voice of the individual, but about debating the ethicalsoundness of different orientations to knowledge and the world. In the context of the study of technologizings of communication, this can be accomplished by introducing a critical discourse on the sustainability or unsustainability of different conceptualizations of the world as mediated by different technologies. Personalized knowledge must become central to this endeavor by providing the ethical framework to compare and evaluate technologizings of communication, by encouraging us to question how the assumptions we make about the world based on the technologies we use affect our lives and the lives of others. Only a combination of theoretical knowledge and personalized knowledge will lead us to the practical strategies we need to follow in order to conceptualize sustainable communicational realities.
Reintegrations to the World
Neither Nature nor the Others will become modern. It is up to us to change our ways of changing. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (1993, p. 145) It is time to re-imagine the process of ''ontological reintegration of the individual to the world'' that Bhola (1992) alludes to when he speaks of literacy, and to try to bring into it other ways of looking at the role of communication technologies in this process. In other words, it is time to personalize our knowledge of the technologizings of communication. One way to achieve this is to start differentiating between the utilization and the use of technologies. According to Wise (1997) , utilization describes the operation of technology within normative rules, that is, a decontextualized experiencing of technology. Conversely, use implies ''the whole sequence of thought, action, and fulfillment'' (p. 75), which in turn promotes a properly interiorized technology that results in sustainable attitudes towards the world.
While avoiding the traps of technological and social determinism, we must determine to what extent the biases of a particular technology in a particular setting are reversible or irreversible. Furthermore, we must be mindful of the role of technology in preserving or erasing cultural identity, particularly when considering the homogenizing effects of Modern communication technologies on other cultures. According to Wark (1995) , [n] ew technology cannot be used to preserve cultural differences. Traditional culture reified as museum interactives-even if they are VR-does not constitute preservation so much as mummification. New technology can be used to create new differences and forms of autonomy and community, but it cannot be used to ''preserve'' old differences in any meaningful sense. Traditional forms of cultural difference are not independent of the techniques used to maintain them. (p. 22) While it is true that Modern communication technologies cannot preserve old differences, it is not necessarily true that everyone in the ''global village'' is in need of new forms of differentiation or, more specifically, in need of the forms of differentiation that virtual technologies bring. In this context, the export of technologizings of communication has become an inherently violent act. The current crusade to bring Modern communication technologies such as the internet, cellular phones, and digital video to every remote village in the world preempts the right of each community to decide which technologies could support their communicational realities and how to organically implement them. Sadly, the way capitalism works, there is already a network for the instantaneous marketing and distribution of unsustainable communicational realities to millions of users around the world.
In essence, then, the argument for sustainable communicational realities is an argument for the ethical design, use, and sharing of communication technologies. Although it sounds simple, it is not a way of thinking that has comes easily in Modernity. According to Borgmann (1992) , ''most social and moral critics do not believe that technology enforces a morally charged form of life; they believe moral codes are articulated autonomously, exercised through the proper use of technology (not necessarily in their design)'' (p. 209). In the profit-driven societies in which we live, the utilization of technology has been completely disassociated from issues of sustainability. Nevertheless, this does not mean that for appropriate conceptualizations of technology we need always to look to the past or to the present through the absolute relativism of multiculturalism. Sustainable communicational realities exist today, in the most obvious places in society, where Modernity turns a blind eye to the appropriation and the merging of old and new technologies. We, not the Others, are the ones who need to rehabilitate that eye if we wish to see them.
The arrogant desire to reach divine heights propelled by decontextualized technologies has always presented a temptation hard to resist-even when it is at the cost of our own humanity. As many of our cultural narratives and myths tell us, salvation cannot be found in improperly interiorized technologies:
The story of the Tower of Babel (whether taken as fact, parable, or both) is instructive in every age. Once again the mighty hunter Nimrod, the professional atheist, beckons the masses to ascend the heights. Once again the Tower will topple: not because the science is faulty, or the technologies will fail, but because the fruits of the material world can neither provide nor replace spiritual comfort and attainment. (D. Barlas, personal correspondence, 1999) The rightful place of technology in our lives is to help us understand our natural and social realities, and to help us design and construct sustainable integrations of our Selves into those realities. Inorganic technologizings which displace that integration to higher levels of abstraction, although useful in terms of raising self-consciousness, can ultimately be socially or environmentally unsustainable. A balance must be sought.
Insofar as technologies are mutually determined by societies, we are to an extent limited in our endeavors to conceptualize sustainable communicational realities using the technologies we now have. Efforts are currently being made to try to reverse the biases of some Modern communication technologies. While many of these efforts are partly successful, they are also insufficient because they do not begin by questioning the sustainability of the technologies in the first place. The result is that they are likely to return us to the models of determinism that we are trying to leave behind. As Woodward (1993) argues in his normative-contextualist theory of technology,
The principal focus for considering communication technologies must shift from the instrument as an object of access or choice towards attention to technology's potential to serve as personal tools in people's ongoing efforts to achieve self knowledge through articulacy, expressivity and moral dialogue. (p. 173) More than the development of new technologies or new ways of subverting old technologies, we need to design new systems in which our mutuallydetermining relationship with technology can be conceptualized into sustainable realities.
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